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ABSTRACT OF THE THESIS 
 
 
The Impact of Transport and Communication Technology on the Division of Labor 
and Stratification of Small-Scale Societies 
 
by 
 
 
Vladimir G. Borel 
 
Master of Arts, Graduate Program in Sociology 
University of California, Riverside, June 2019 
Dr. Christopher Chase-Dunn, Chairperson 
 
 
 
 
 
This article presents a societal level cross-cultural analysis that explores the 
relationship between division of labor and stratification, as well as the effect that 
transport and communication technology have on this relationship. It is reasoned 
that social stratification and political hierarchy, as the byproduct of integrative 
forces are, in part, a function of the division of labor, transport and communication 
technology. The analysis finds a positive relationship between occupational 
specialization and political and economic inequalities in 186 small-scale societies, as 
well as an increased concentration of political and economic power as the cost of 
exchanging information and resources decrease resulting from innovation in 
transport and communication technology. In other words, concordant with the 
pessimist view of technological progress, transport and communication technology 
innovations seem to have historically benefited mostly the individuals at the top of 
 v
these political and economic stratification systems as they have an amplifying effect 
on the division of labor and stratification relationship. The results are discussed in 
terms of understanding the role that information systems, and transportation play 
in the de-centralizing or centralizing of resource as well as decision-making. The 
article closes with a discussion of possible implications for contemporary societies. 
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INTRODUCTION 
 
The reasons for the emergence and perpetuation of economic stratification and 
political hierarchy in pre-industrial society have been the object of long standing 
debate. Although there is agreement that institutions are required to maintain 
cooperation among large human groups (Dunbar 1992, 1993; Turchin & Gavrilets 
2009), researchers attribute their existence to many different phenomena. The 
creation and sustenance of such institutions is explained in terms of inter-group 
competition or “costly cooperation” (Mathew & Boyd 2011, Turchin 2009; Turchin, 
Currie, Turner & Gavrilets 2013), the development of capital-intensive subsistence 
techniques (Nolan & Lenski 1996, Gilman 1981), greater cultural isolation among 
subpopulations within a society (Henrich & Boyd 2008), surplus and labor structure 
– “slavery” or “wage labor” (Ruyle 1973) or the presence or absence of “landesque” 
capital – intensive agriculture that involves permanent changes to the landscape 
(Atkinson et al. 2018).  
Although all of the above may play a role, Spencer focuses on the 
differentiation of the operative functions – activities of extraction and 
transformation material resources that sustain a social system – as the principle 
cause of the emergence of hierarchies. The consequence is the increase in 
complexity and resource intensity of the distributive – activities that allocate 
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resources among subgroups of extraction and transformation – and regulatory 
functions – activities that enforce rules and regulations as well as mediate conflicts. 
To this is added the effect to technology, whose effect can either be 
equalizing or polarizing as “technical change occurs in […] an arena in which power 
and influence are unequally distributed among a relatively large number of agents” 
(Hard 1993: 423). Technologies are seen as unequally benefitting segments of 
society which creates the potential for resistance or cooptation.  
This paper has three main objectives. The first is to detail Spencer’s Theory 
of Societal Evolution as it relates to the emergence of economic and political 
stratification. The second is to introduce the role of transport and communication 
technology (henceforth TCT) as a moderating factor in Spencer’s theory. The third is 
to formulate and test hypotheses consistent with Spencer’s theory of economic and 
political stratification, and with the role of TCTs in moderating key mechanisms of 
Spencer’s theory.  
 
1. The Stratifying Effect of Division of Labor According to Spencer 
 
In this section, I elaborate Spencer’s theory of the relationship between division of 
labor and both economic stratification and political hierarchy. Spencer’s theory 
begins with the notion that the maintenance of human society requires that they 
successfully pursue basic biological needs within the constraints of a more or less 
fixed environment. Through this negotiated process, patterns of extraction, 
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transformation, distribution and consumption emerge1. In a Robinson Crusoe-like 
hunter-gatherer tribe, this social manipulation of the environment leads to a stable 
structure of production and exchange between members. Each of the constitutive 
activities can be done by all members of the social unit or by specialized 
individuals2. 
In the hunter-gatherer society, the labor is relatively homogeneously 
distributed among members (although sex and age are important determinants). All 
members perform the two tasks – hunting and gathering – required for the material 
reproduction of the unit. As societies become more complex, however, divisions of 
labor begin to emerge. In an agrarian surplus society, for example, a subset of 
individuals specializes and become responsible for the protection of the farmers and 
surplus.  
The division of labor creates divergent interests and increasing 
interdependence among the respective subunits. In an agrarian surplus society 
composed of soldiers and farmers, the farmers have an incentive to keep all of the 
production for themselves and the military has an incentive to expropriate all the 
production from agriculture. At the same time, the two subgroups also become more 
interdependent. Farmers need soldiers to protect the crops and soldiers need 
farmers to eat. As the number of tasks requiring specialization increases so does the 
number and intensity of interdependencies as well as competing interests.  
                                                        
1 Operative functions 
2 Undifferentiated or differentiated, respectively. 
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For society to persist in the context of this increasing tension, it must 
establish institutions for coordination and control3. As the division of labor 
increases, so does the complexity of the production relations. Coordination is 
necessary to allocate resources and information among subgroups 4. Part of the 
farmer’s output is distributed to the soldier, who in turn provides protection for the 
farmer. As the society gradually becomes more complex, engineers responsible for 
irrigation and sewage, and metalworkers that provide weapons and tools, gradually 
emerge. Each of the subgroup’s production must be allocated efficiently enough to 
all other subgroups and all of the transformed products must subsequently be 
reallocated.  
Similarly, diverging economic, political interests and increasing social 
distance, increase the likelihood of conflict occurring. These conflicts must be 
mediated by institutions for control, which make decisions and enforce them5. In our 
agrarian society some institutions are established to constrain the opportunities for 
violence, such as courts of law or a publicly funded army. By making some courses 
of action viable and others not, these emergent institutions shape the flow of 
resources and information. Indeed, these institutions themselves become a new 
subgroup in the division of labor. The ability of these institutions to shape the 
structure of interaction is dependent on their ability to acquire greater decision-
                                                        
3 Integration  
4 Distributive functions  
5 Regulatory functions 
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making power and resources than the subgroups they mediate and coordinate. Both 
political hierarchy and economic stratification are manifestations of this differential.  
The creation of institutions for coordination and control creates the 
possibility for further division of labor. The processes of differentiation and 
integration must be tightly coupled for the social system not to “disintegrate”. In 
sum, the differential in resources and decision-making power required by 
institutions for coordination and control translates to an inequality in economic and 
political power. Hence Hypotheses 1, derived from the Spencerian Theory: 
 
• Hypothesis 1a: The greater the labor specialization, the greater the 
economic stratification 
 
• Hypothesis 1b: The greater the labor specialization, the greater the political 
hierarchy 
  
2. Transportation and Communication Technologies, and the Stratifying Effect of 
Division of Labor 
 
In the section above I described the causal process that links the division of labor to 
political hierarchy and economic stratification. In this section I theorize the impact 
that TCTs have on the relationship between the division of labor and 
political/economic stratification. Technology is seen here as inextricably embedded 
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in power relations and therefore as an essential force shaping social relations: 
“Technological change […] can best be understood as the result of conflicts between 
[…] professional ‘status groups’ fighting for influence and control.” (Hård 1993: 
426).  
When new technologies are introduced in a social system, they tend to 
restructure interaction due to their effect on the cost of performing a function – in 
our case, that of exchanging information or resources. This reduction in cost can 
lead to two opposite outcomes. On the one hand, it may enhance the ability of the 
above-described institutions to expropriate additional economic resources and 
political power. In this potentiality, transportation and communication technology 
increases the effect of the division of labor on economic and political stratification. 
On the other, these technologies may reduce the dependency of society’s various 
parts on the coordinating and control functions of the emergent institutions. Here, 
other subgroups can interact directly to negotiate their conflicting interests, which 
limits the ability of institutions of coordination and control to expropriate economic 
resources. In this scenario, transportation and communication technologies reduce 
the impact of the division of labor on political and economic stratification. 
Any focal social sub-unit requires that information, like resources, be 
allocated efficiently between subgroups. For example, information about the stock 
of raw resources required for production must be allocated to the metal smith. 
Similarly, the farmer needs to be aware of the number of citizens he must produce 
for. The same applies to material resources. The unit has a finite amount of ore and 
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must decide where to allocate it based on the information about its different 
subgroup’s needs. The transmission of information has a cost, and technology 
reduces these costs. 
Subgroups resulting from the division of labor may require more institutions 
to mediate transactions because of the entry cost & complexity increase. The higher 
entry cost (giving access to technologies) increases the need to concentrate 
resources, decreasing diffusion capacity, and higher complexity associated with the 
use of certain technologies increase the need to concentrate decision-making, 
decreasing diffusion capacity. In the first case, no single group can bear the cost of 
building the technology, requiring groups to concentrate resources in a third party 
that is then able to, requiring a delegation of resources. In the second case, the time 
required to master a certain technology might prevent all members from accessing 
it, requiring them to delegate some of their decision-making. 
Consider our agrarian society, being subject to a division of labor, is 
organized hierarchically. Heads of occupational groups allocate resources within 
subgroups. They also consult the chieftain, who decides were to allocate resources 
and information, mediates conflicts and enforces rules. On the one hand, the 
introduction of writing could allow him to codify rules, to transmit orders faster, 
further or more reliably. Similarly, the introduction of a wheeled wagon pulled by 
horses could allow him to transport soldiers and resources where needed faster, 
further and more reliably. The overall cost of coordination and control decreases, 
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increasing the ability of the chieftain to expand his power, ultimately increasing 
stratification. 
 
• Hypothesis 2a: Transport and communication technologies increase the 
effect of the division of labor on economic stratification. 
• Hypothesis 2b: Transport and communication technologies increase the 
effect of the division of labor on political hierarchy. 
 
On the other hand, the introduction of writing in the agrarian society ruled 
by the heads and the chieftain could reduce the dependency of other groups on 
these figures. With the ability to write more widely diffused, each individual can 
communicate complex information directly, which requires less delegation. 
Similarly, with transport innovations, the dependence of the individuals or the 
subgroups is reduced. Instead of requiring a central institution whose role it is to 
collect and subsequently coordinate the redistribution of production, the subgroups 
can directly communicate information and exchange resources amongst themselves, 
alleviating the need to delegate decision-making power and resource to the 
chieftain. The overall cost of coordination and control decreases, increasing the 
ability of specialized subgroups to bypass these traditional institutions. 
Subgroups resulting from the division of labor require fewer institutions to 
mediate relationships because the entry cost  & complexity decease. The lower entry 
costs decrease the need to concentrate resources, increasing diffusion potential of 
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technologies whereas the lower complexity decreases the need to concentrate 
decision-making. In the first case, every subgroup is able to afford the costs of 
adopting the new technologies, increasing its ability to use them to coordinate with 
other subgroups having similar technologies. In the second case, every subgroup is 
able to access and use technologies without technocratic intermediaries. 
 
• Hypothesis 3a: Transport and communication technologies reduce the 
effect of the division of labor on economic stratification. 
• Hypothesis 3b: Transport and communication technologies reduce the 
effect of the division of labor on political hierarchy. 
 
In sum, if economic stratification and political hierarchies emerge as a result of the 
greater command over material resources of institutions of coordination and 
control, we should expect innovations in TCTs to impact the ability of these 
institutions to expropriate societal resources. If transportation and communication 
technologies enhance the capacities of institutions for coordination and control to 
usurp power from subgroups, we should expect that they also increase the 
stratifying effect of the division of labor. Conversely, if technologies allow subgroups 
to coordinate without the necessity of institutions of coordination and control, they 
should reduce the stratifying effect of the division of labor  
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DATA 
 
George P. Murdock and Douglas R. White’s Standard Cross-Cultural was used to test 
these hypotheses. The Standard Cross-Cultural is a dataset containing 186  
ethnographically “best-described” small-scale societies. These were cases were 
selected for maximal independence of cases in terms of cultural and historical origin 
(Galton) as well as geographical representativeness (Eff 2004, Eff & Dow 2009). 
Small-scale societies were selected for methodological reasons. They can be argued 
to be independent of one another, allowing us to argue the independence and 
representativeness of these societies. This allows us to generalize. On the other 
hand, large scale, industrialized societies have influenced each other (diffusion of 
ideologies, resources, etc.) making a comparative approach aiming to extract 
communalities between cases, almost meaningless. 
 
Dependent Variables 
 
Economic Stratification is coded as: (5) the society exhibits a complex stratification 
into three or more distinct classes or castes regardless of the presence or absence of 
slavery, (4) the society is stratified into two social classes of freemen, plus 
hereditary slavery and/or recognized caste divisions, (3) the society is stratified 
into two social classes of freemen but lacks both caste distinctions and hereditary 
slavery, (2) formal class distinctions are lacking among freemen, but hereditary 
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slavery prevails and/or there are important status differences based on the 
possession or distribution of wealth, (1) the society is essentially egalitarian, lacking 
social classes, castes, hereditary slavery, and important wealth distinction. Category 
four describes three or more class distinctions in society, with or without slavery, 
categories three and two describes two class distinctions, with and without slavery, 
respectively, and categories two and one reflect societies with no class distinction 
with and without slavery, respectively. 
 
(5) 3 + class division + slavery 
                                    + no slavery 
(4) 2 class division     + slavery 
(3) 2 class division      + no slavery 
(2) 0 class division     + slavery 
(1) 0 class division      + no slavery 
 
Political hierarchy is coded as: (4) three or more administrative levels are 
recognized above that of community, as in the case of a large state organized into 
provinces are subdivided into districts, (3) two administrative levels are recognized 
above that of the local community, as in the case of a small state divided into 
administrative districts, (2) one administrative level is recognized above that of the 
local community, as in the case of a petty state with a paramount chief ruling over a 
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number of local communities, (1) the society is stateless but is composed of 
politically organized autonomous local communities.  
 
(4) 3+ administrative levels above community level 
(3) 2 administrative levels above community level 
(2) 1 administrative level above community level 
(1) 0 administrative levels above community level 
 
Independent Variable 
 
Division of Labor is categorized as: (5) The society is reported to have a variety of 
craft specialists including at least smiths, weavers, and potters, (4) The society is 
reported to have specialized metalworkers or smiths but to lack loom weaving 
and/or pottery, (3) Loom weaving is practiced but metalworking is absent or 
unreported, (2) Pottery is made but metalworking and loom weaving are absent or 
unreported, (1) Metalworking, loom weaving, and pottery making are all absent or 
unreported. This scale is designed to “measure the degree of complexity and 
specialization in technological crafts” (Murdock and Provost, 1973) 
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Moderating Variables 
 
Transport and the Communication Technologies variables were standardized (x* = 
(x-µ)/σ) and added to give the TCT index. This index was created because both 
technology types have the same theoretical expected effects (positive) and can 
therefore me aggregated into a single measure of TCT development.  
Communication technology is coded as: (5) The society has an indigenous 
system of true writing and possesses written records of at least modest significance, 
(4) The society has an indigenous system of writing but lacks any significant 
accumulation of written records, or alternatively has long used the script of alien 
people, (3) The society lacks true writing but possesses significant non-written 
records in the form of picture writing, quipus, pictorial inscriptions, or the like, (2) 
Writing and significant records are lacking but the people employ mnemonic 
devices, e.g., simple tallies, (1) Writing, records, and mnemonic devices in any form 
are lacking or unreported. 
This scale was devised to take account of the “widely recognized distinction 
between literate and non-literate (or preliterate) societies […] it assigns higher 
scores to writing and lower ones to non-written records and mnemonic devices” 
(Murdock and Provost 1973). 
 
(5) Writing  + Records 
(4) Writing  + No records 
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(3) No writing + Records 
(2) No writing + No records 
(1) No writing + No records + No mnemonic devices 
 
Land Transport is categorized as: (5) automotive vehicles, e.g., railroads and trucks, 
are employed extensively in land transport. Since these have commonly been 
introduced by foreigners in formerly colonial areas they are indicated only where 
they were thoroughly integrated into the indigenous economy at the pin-pointed 
date, (4) animal-drawn wheeled vehicles are employed in land transport but 
motorized vehicles are seldom or never used, (3) land transport is conducted to a 
considerable extent by means of draft animals dragging a sled, travois, or other 
vehicle without wheels, (2) land transport is effected mainly by pack rather than 
draft animals, (1) Land transport is effected exclusively by human carriers. 
This measure is designed to “measure the degree of complexity in the means 
of land transportation and thus presumably indirectly the extent of intergroup 
trade” (Murdock and Provost 1973). 
 
(5) Automotive 
(4) Draft animal + Wheels 
(3) Draft animal + No wheels 
(2) Pack animal  
(1) Human carriers 
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Control Variable 
 
Spencer theorized that demographic factors have an effect on political and economic 
structures. His contention was that societies could not grow by mere linear increase 
in numbers. The social structure has to be compounded, where multiple small 
integrated groups aggregate into multiple intermediate integrated groups which in 
turn aggregate into a large integrated group: “holding a compound structure implies 
a head of the whole as well as heads of the parts” (Spencer 1898). These groups are 
integrated at multiple levels, which creates a hierarchical form of organization that 
can be summarized by the idea of “chiefs and the chief of chiefs”. This definition of 
compounding corresponds to our operationalization of political hierarchy; if we 
were to omit this control, we risk measuring the effect of population compounding 
due to size increases instead of the effect of division of labor. We will therefore 
control for this demographic factor. In addition to the concentration of decision 
making-power, we extend his definition to the concentration of resources. 
Population Size is our demographic control variable and is simply the 
number of individuals that compose the social system. It is categorized as: (1) ‘< 50’, 
(2) ‘50-99’, (2) ‘100-199’, (3) ‘200-399’, (4) ‘400-999’, (5) ‘1,000-4,999’, (6) ‘5,000-
49,999’, (7) ‘> 50,000’. The population size of the “focal or typical community is 
ranked by a numerical symbol in one of the categories” (Murdock and Wilson 1972). 
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Variable Obs Mean Std. Dev. Min Max
Economic Stratification 175 2.451429 1.449013 1 5
Political Stratification 172 2.034884 1.112898 1 4
Division of Labor 175 3.097143 1.421001 1 5
Information Systems 175 2.36 1.466719 1 5
Transport 174 1.770115 1.160039 1 5
TCT 173 -.0025073 1.764571 -1.592768 4.569625
Population Size 174 3.45977 1.705514 1 8
Table 1. Descriptive Statistics
 
METHODS 
 
The data analysis was performed in two stages. In the first phase, models are 
estimated using multivariate Ordinary Least Square regression treating the data as 
continuous (4 models). In the second phase, after dichotomizing our two dependent 
variables to more closely approximate the actual relationships given the nature of 
our variables (categorical & ordinal), we estimate the second models using Logistic 
Regression (4 models). In both phases, the Transport and the Communication 
Technologies variables were standardized (x* = (x-µ)/σ) and added to give the TCT 
variable. This index was created because both technology types have the same 
theoretical expected effects (positive). The analysis was performed in two phases 
for robustness. The objective is to cross validate the results found in the first phase 
with the one’s found in the second phase. 
As moderating variables, TCTs are expected influence the strength of the 
effect of division of labor on economic stratification and political hierarchy. The 
interaction term quantifies the change in the effect of an independent variable on a 
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dependent variable by a moderating variable. Thus, the coefficient given to us by the 
interaction terms reflect the strength of the effect of division of labor on both 
economic stratification and political hierarchy by values of TCTs. For example, 
division of labor may have a weak effect on economic stratification when 
Communication Technologies are ‘low’ but a very strong effect when 
Communication Technologies are ‘high’: it moderates the effects. 
Predicting the different outcomes, if division of labor must be accompanied 
by a certain amount of inequality, as Spencer contended, we expect to find positive 
and significant relationship between division of labor and both political hierarchy 
and economic stratification. If innovations in TCTs moderate this relationship, we 
should find significant relationships between the interaction terms and our 
dependent variables. In addition, if the reduction in the cost of exchanging 
information and resources benefits disproportionately the elite – techno-pessimist 
perspective – we expect positive coefficients for the interaction terms; conversely, if 
this reduction of the costs of exchanging information and resources benefits 
disproportionately the specialized sub-clusters – techno-optimist perspective – we 
expect negative coefficients for the interaction terms. 
 
FINDINGS 
 
In this section, we will go over each of the two phases of our analysis sequentially, 
beginning with least squares followed logistic regressions. We fit a model to our 
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data using OLS regression, treating the variables as continuous, and refit using 
logistic regression for robustness. The objective being to show that with both set of 
assumptions we arrive at similar results. The first results were estimated by 
ordinary least squared regression with and without interaction (Table 1). The 
second phase describes the results for four logistic regression models with and 
without interaction (Table 2).  
 
First Phase: Ordinary Least Square Models 
 
Table 2 shows the results for two multivariate least square regressions models with 
interaction. Model 1 describes the relationship between Political Hierarchy and 
Division of Labor, the additive term Transport and Communication Technology 
(TCT), controlling for Population Size. Model 3 describes the same relationship with 
Economic Stratification as outcome. These models refer to hypothesis 1a and 1b. 
To adjudicate between contending claims (techno-optimist and techno-
pessimist), we include the TCT moderation to the relationships previously analyzed. 
Models 2 show interaction effect of TCTs and Division of Labor on Political 
Hierarchy, while model 4 shows the same interaction for Economic Stratification. 
These interaction terms quantify the change in the effect of Division of Labor on 
Political Hierarchy and Economic Stratification by TCTs. These models refer to 
hypothesis 2a and 2b as well as 3a and 3b. 
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(1) (2) (3)   (4)   
Political 
Hierarchy
Political 
Hierarchy
Economic 
Stratification
Economic 
Stratification
Division of Labor 0.260*** 0.291*** 0.254*** 0.334***
(0.058) (0.058) (0.073)   (0.070)   
0.202*** -0.040 0.333*** -0.305   
(0.045) (0.136) (0.049)   (0.165)   
0.058 0.152***
(0.030) (0.036)   
Population Size 0.126** 0.118** 0.181*** 0.156***
(0.043) (0.042) (0.048)   (0.046)   
Intercept 0.809*** 0.666*** 1.039*** 0.667** 
(0.171) (0.197) (0.216)   (0.234)   
N 170 170 173   173   
R-sq 0.460 0.468 0.493   0.526   
F (3, 166)= 70.17*** (4, 165)= 53.82*** (3, 169)= 74.42*** (4, 168)= 53.82***
Note: p< .05; p< .01; p<.001
Table 2. Least Square Regression of Economic Stratification and Political Hierarchy on Division of Labor,TCT and 
Population Size, with and without the Interaction of Division of Labor and Information Systems/Transport
Division of Labor *
TCT
TCT
 
Model 1 describes the relationship between Political Hierarchy and Division 
of Labor, TCT, controlling for Population Size. Our overall model is statistically 
significant and is a decent fit as it explains 46.0% of the variance in our dependent 
variable (R2= .460). Division of Labor (ß= .260; p= 0.000) is positive and statistically 
significant, as predicted by Hypothesis 1a. The statistical significance and positive 
sign of the first coefficient indicate that, for a one unit increase in Division of Labor, 
Political Hierarchy increases by .260, when TCT and population size = 0. 
Model 2 describes the relationship between Political Hierarchy and the 
interaction of Division of Labor and TCT, controlling for Population Size. Our overall 
model is statistically significant and is a decent fit as our model explains 46.8% of 
the variance in our dependent (R2= .468). Our interaction term, TCT * Division of 
Labor, is positive and barely non-significant (ß= .058; p= .052). For a one-unit 
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increase in TCT, the effect of Division of Labor on Political Hierarchy increases by 
.058. These results do not allow us to adjudicate between Hypotheses 2a and 3a. 
Model 3 describes the relationship between Economic Stratification and 
Division of Labor and TCT, controlling for Population Size. Our overall model is 
statistically significant and is a decent fit as our model explains 49.3% of the 
variance in our dependent (R2= .493). The statistical significance of Division of 
Labor (ß= .254; p= 0.000), indicates that, for a one unit increase in Division of Labor, 
Economic Stratification increases by .333 when TCT and Population Size = 0. This is 
evidence in favor of Hypothesis 1b. 
Model 4 describes the relationship between Economic Stratification and the 
interaction of Division of Labor and TCT, controlling for Population Size. Our overall 
model is statistically significant and is a decent fit as our model explains 52.6% of 
the variance in our dependent (R2= .526). The interaction of Division of Labor and 
TCT (ß= .152; p= 0.000) is statistically significant and positive. For a one-unit 
increase in TCT, the effect of Division of Labor on Economic Stratification increases 
by .058. These results are consistent with Hypothesis 2b and 3b. 
In addition to Division of Labor being positive and significant in all four 
models, the coefficient for the interaction of Division of Labor and TCT in model 3 
suggests that as TCT capabilities increase, so does the effect of Division of Labor on 
Economic Stratification. It is less clear weather or not this is the case for Political 
Hierarchy. These findings suggest that, not only does division in labor increase the 
need for coordination and control – as predicted by hypotheses 1a and 1b –, but the 
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reduction in the cost of coordinating and controlling has historically 
disproportionately benefited those with already available resources – the techno-
pessimist hypotheses 2a and b.  
 
Second Phase: Robustness Check  
 
We test the same hypotheses with alternative specifications. Table 3 shows two 
logistic regression model results. Logistic regression coefficients give the change in 
the log odds of the outcome for a one-unit increase in the predictor variable. 
 
(5)   (6)   (7) (8)
Political 
Hierarchy
Political 
Hierarchy
Economic 
Stratification
Economic 
Stratification
Division of Labor 0.699** 0.788** 0.678* 0.805**
(0.257) (0.260)   (0.265) (0.258)
0.405** -0.551   0.486*** -0.929
(0.142) (0.681)   (0.134) (0.616)
0.231   0.341*
(0.157)   (0.146)
Population Size 0.322* 0.303*  0.252 0.222
(0.144) (0.138)   (0.132) (0.134)
Intercept -4.508*** -4.925*** -4.487*** -5.083***
(0.883) (1.000)   (0.972) (0.976)
N 170 170   173 173
R-Square 0.348 0.358 0.367  0.387
Wald Chi-Square (3)= 48.03*** (4)= 44.89*** (3)= 44.42*** (4)= 40.77***
Note: p< .05; p< .01; p<.001
Table 3. Logistic Regression of Economic Stratification and Political Hierarchy on Division of Labor,TCT and Population 
Size, with and without the Interaction of Division of Labor and Information Systems/Transport
Division of Labor * 
TCT
TCT
 
Model 5 describes the relationship between Political Hierarchy and Division 
of Labor controlling for Population Size and TCT, corresponding to Hypothesis 1a. 
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Our overall model is statistically significant and is a decent fit as our model explains 
34.8% of the variance in our dependent (R2= .348). Division of Labor (ß= .699; p= 
0.007), is positive and statistically significant, as expected, indicating that for a one 
unit increase in Division of Labor, Political Hierarchy increases by .699 when TCT 
and Population Size = 0. As expected, as Division of Labor increases, so does Political 
Hierarchy. 
Model 6 shows the moderation of TCTs on the relationship between Division 
of Labor and Political Hierarchy controlling for Population Size, corresponding to 
Hypothesis 2a and 3a. Our overall model is statistically significant and is a good fit 
as our model explains 35.8% of the variance in our dependent (R2= .358). The 
interaction term (ß= .231; p= .142) is not statistically significant. The Division of 
Labor coefficient describes the effect of Division of Labor on Political Hierarchy 
when TCTs and Population Size = 0. For every one-unit change in Division of Labor, 
the log odds of high Political Hierarchy (versus low Political Hierarchy) increases by 
0.788. The Division of Labor * TCT coefficient describes a .231 change in the effect of 
Division of Labor on Political Hierarchy for every unit increase in the TCT variable. 
The lack of significance of our interaction term in Model 6 does not allow us to make 
any conclusion about the effect of TCTs on the relationship between Division of 
Labor and Political Hierarchy. 
Model 7 shows the moderation of TCTs on the relationship between Division 
of Labor and Economic Stratification, controlling for Population Size. Our overall 
model is statistically significant and is a good fit as our model explains 36.7% of the 
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variance in our dependent (R2= .367). The coefficients for Division of Labor (ß= 
.678; p= 0.011) is positive and statistically significant, as predicted by Hypothesis 
1b, indicating that for a one unit increase in Division of Labor, Economic 
Stratification increases by .678. As expected, as Division of Labor increases, so does 
Economic Stratification. 
Next to it, Model 8 is statistically significant and is a decent fit as our model explains 
38.7% of the variance in our dependent variable (R2= .387). The interaction term 
(ß= .341; p= .02) is positive and statistically significant as predicted by Hypothesis 
2b and 3b. The Division of Labor * TCT coefficient describes a .341 change in the 
effect of Division of Labor on Economic Stratification for every unit increase in the 
TCT variable. The positive and significant coefficient of the interaction in Model 8 
suggests that as TCTs have developed, the effect of Division of Labor on Economic 
Stratification increases in size, positively moderating the relationship. The results 
suggest that the impact of Division of Labor on Political Hierarchy and Economic 
Stratification varies significantly with the level of TCTs in a society. 
 
Substantive Significance  
 
 To examine the substantive importance of the variation (how much), we 
examine the marginal effects of Division of Labor on both Economic Stratification 
and Political Hierarchy as they vary by TCTs, for both the least-square and logistic 
models. That is, the variation of the overall effect of our independent variable on our 
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dependent variable as it varies across the observed range of our moderating 
covariate. The x-axis denotes the observed range of the moderating variable, the y-
axis displays the marginal effects of Division of Labor on, separately, Economic 
Stratification and Political Hierarchy, and the upper and lower lines indicate the 95 
percent confidence intervals.  
Each Figure shows the marginal effects across the analyses in Tables 2 and 3. 
Figure 1 illustrates the analysis of Model 2 in Table 2. Figure 2 illustrates the 
analysis of Model 4 in Table 2. Figure 3 illustrates the analysis of Model 6 in Table 3. 
Figure 4 illustrates the analysis of Model 8 in Table 3. These marginal effects are 
obtained from the coefficients reported in models 2 and 4 of table 2, and 6 and 8 of 
table 3. All figures suggest that variation in the effect of TCTs is large. We estimate 
unique coefficients for Division of Labor at each level (.05 intervals) of TCT, within a 
range (from -1.592768 to 4.569). In all Figures the effect of TCT is positive. In 
addition, in all Figures, except 3, the effect at the lower levels of the moderating 
variable is non-significant. 
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Figure 1. Marginal Effects of Division of Labor on Economic Stratification across 
Observed Range of Information Systems and Transportation (Table 2 Model 2) 
 
 
 
The first figure illustrates the marginal effects of Division of Labor on 
Economic Stratification across the observed values of TCT in our Least-Square 
model. I fail to reject the null hypothesis that Division of Labor significantly 
increases Economic Stratification across the full range of TCT. Though not 
significant (p= 0.241), at the minimum value of TCT (-1.592768) the coefficient is 
.0927074. Significance is gained when TCT has a value of -1.242768. At the 
maximum value of TCT (4.569), on the other hand, the coefficient is 1.027094 and is 
statistically significant (p= .000). This represent an overall change of 1007.888% in 
the effect of Division of Labor on Economic Stratification across the range of TCT. 
The effect of Division of Labor on Economic Stratification is 1000% bigger for 
societies with more cost efficient TCT.  
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Figure 2. Marginal Effects of Division of Labor on Political Hierarchy across Observed 
Range of Information Systems and Transportation (Table 2 Model 4) 
 
 
 
The second figure illustrates the magnitude of the effect of Division of Labor 
on Political Hierarchy across the observed values of TCT in our Least-Square model. 
I reject the null hypothesis that Division of Labor significantly increases Economic 
Stratification across the full range of TCT. At the minimum value of TCT (-1.592768) 
the coefficient is .1988343 and is significant (p= 0.003). At the maximum value of 
TCT (4.569) the coefficient is  .55434 and is significant as well (p= .000). This 
represents a 178.795% increase in the effect of Division of Labor on Economic 
Stratification across the moderating variable. The effect of Division of Labor on 
Political Stratification is 180% bigger for societies with more cost efficient TCT.  
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Figure 3. Marginal Effects of Division of Labor on Economic Stratification across 
Observed Range of Information Systems and Transportation (Table 3 Model 6) 
 
 
 
The third figure illustrates the marginal effect of Division of Labor on 
Economic Stratification across the observed values of TCT in our logistic model. I fail 
to reject the null hypothesis that Division of Labor significantly increases Economic 
Stratification across the full range of TCT. Though not statistically significant (p= 
0.360), at its minimum value, TCT (-1.592768) has a coefficient of .2622393. 
Significance is gained when TCT has a value of -.792768. At its maximum value 
(4.569) the coefficient is 2.363681 and is significant (p= .003). This represents an 
overall change of 801.345% in the effect of division of labor on economic 
stratification from the minimum to the maximum of TCT. 
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Figure 4. Marginal Effects of Division of Labor on Political Hierarchy across Observed 
Range of Information Systems and Transportation (Table 3 Model 8) 
 
 
 
The fourth figure illustrates the magnitude of the effect of Division of Labor 
on Political Hierarchy across the full range of TCT. I fail to reject the null hypothesis 
that Division of Labor significantly increase Political Hierarchy across the full range 
of TCT.  Though non significant (p= .163), at the minimum value of TCT (-1.592768) 
the coefficient is .4200927. Significance is gained when TCT has a value of -
1.092768. At the maximum value of TCT (4.569), on the other hand, the coefficient is 
1.843041 and is statistically significant (p= .027). This represents a 338.722% 
overall increase in the effect of division of labor on political hierarchy, as the ability 
to exchange information and resources, through TCT, increases.  
 On average, societies with high division of labor have high political hierarchy 
and economic stratification. Additionally, the analysis of the marginal effects enables 
us to see the magnitude of the effect that the ability to exchange information and 
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resources has on the effect of division of labor on both economic stratification and 
political hierarchy. Russian (Russia), Balinese (Indonesia), Javanese (Indonesia) and 
Irish (Ireland) societies represent the most hierarchically organized and stratified 
societies, having the highest division of labor and TCT. 
There are, however, some societies that do not fit the pattern. Outliers such 
as the Riffian (Morocco) and Zuni (New Mexico) societies, have a high division of 
labor but very little stratification or hierarchy. On the other hand, there are no 
societies without division of labor that have more than 2 economic classes or 
administrative levels. Lower levels of TCT seem to not affect the main relationship. 
For example, small-scale societies such as the Thonga, North Paiute and Alleut have 
too little TCTs for it to have a significant moderating effect on the main relationship. 
 
CONCLUSION 
 
In this article I contribute to both theory building, by synthesizing Spencer’s Theory 
of Societal Evolution with perspectives on the role of technology in power relations, 
and empirical analyses of stratification, by testing the hypotheses derived from the 
integration of these approaches. First, I articulate macro-level mechanisms by which 
division of labor causes inequality, second, the macro-level mechanisms by which 
TCTs promote or impede this inequality and third I empirically evaluate two 
divergent positions on the effect of TCTs on inequality. 
 30
To summarize, we find support for both hypotheses derived from the 
Spencerian Theory – as the degree of division of labor increases so does political 
hierarchy and economic stratification. Small-scale societies with lower degrees of 
social division of labor tended to also have lower levels of economic stratification 
and political hierarchy. Conversely, those with higher degrees of social division of 
labor tended to also have higher levels of economic stratification and political 
hierarchy. Our findings suggest that division of labor and stratification “coevolves in 
predictable ways” (Turchin et al. 2018; also see Turchin 2009).  
Moreover, some support is found for both hypotheses derived from the 
Techno-pessimist perspective – that TCTs have a positive moderating effect on the 
relationship between division of labor and economic stratification. Conversely, no 
support is found for hypotheses derived from the Techno-optimist – that TCTs have 
a negative moderating effect on the relationship between economic stratification 
and occupational specialization. The magnitude of this moderating effect appears 
rather substantial although lower levels of TCTs do not have a significant effect on 
the main relationship. The effects of division of labor in small-scale societies are 
orders of magnitude greater in societies like the Burmese, Romans and Russians, 
that have advanced TCTs, than they are in societies like the Gond, Tallensi or Toda. I 
find that those innovations in TCTs have historically tended towards increasing the 
“positional advantage” of groups with already existing resources and decision-
making power.  
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The interactions involving Political Hierarchy fell just short of significance at 
conventional thresholds while the interaction involving Economic Stratification 
appears to produce the largest gains per unit increase in TCTs. Our findings are 
consistent with the Techno-pessimist hypotheses that posit that the improvements 
of technological innovation have historically disproportionately benefited the top 
strata of society at the expense of the lower. Additionally, lower levels of TCT have 
no significant effect the main relationships between Division of Labor and both 
Economic Stratification and Political Hierarchy. Innovations that allowed the 
transmission of more complex information faster and more reliably as well as those 
that allow the exchange of more resources faster and more reliably seem to have 
increased the amount of inequality between societal sub-groups. This implies that 
technologies are either asymmetrically diffused and/or their adoption patterns are 
unequal leading to the reproduction the structure of information and resource 
exchange.  
Economic and political power, accrued through control over the regulatory 
and distributive functions, shapes a group’s (Grimes 2017) ability affect the overall 
structure of the operative functions. This ability to affect the system implies the 
choice of altering or reproducing the structure, and therefore the possibility of 
realizing one’s interests. Power, prestige and wealth are seen as inevitably being 
concentrated in an elite like Mill’s (1956) “warlords, corporate and statesman”, or 
Marx’s “bourgeoisie”. Through the control technologies required to interact, 
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individuals are able to manipulate the structure of interaction: power begets power. 
Technologies are not neutral and are imbued by power (Feenberg 1991).  
Finally, future work can address some of the limitations of this study. First, 
the measurement of our key variables could be improved with alternative coding 
schemes6. Other than the categorical nature of my key variables, what makes them 
difficult to manipulate is the coding scheme. For example, it is difficult to interpret 
the coding scheme for both the variables included in the TCT index. Second, political 
hierarchy could be used as a measure of the strength of institutions for coordination 
and control, which would mediate the relationship between division of labor and 
economic stratification. Third and finally, because our indicators are synchronous 
estimates (cross-sectional) rather than measurements of change over time, it is 
difficult to establish a causal order and therefore to eliminate the possibility of 
reverse causation. This could be solved by the use of longitudinal data. 
  
 
 
 
 
                                                        
6 A more suited operationalization of Economic Stratification would be a Gini index, measuring the income 
or wealth distribution among a population. The number of economic classes is also an adequate measure of 
economic stratification.  
The number of intermediaries between the lowest and highest decision-makers is, for our purpose, an 
adequate operationalization of Political Hierarchy as it describes the compounding. 
A more suited operationalization of Division of Labor would simply be the number of different 
occupational specialization or occupational sectors, measuring the number of occupational groups with 
which diverging interests and interdependence emerges. 
A more suited operationalization of the Communication Technology variable would be the energy cost per 
unit of weight per unit of time that the society is able to move. 
A more suited operationalization of the Transport Technology variable would be the energy cost per unit of 
volume per unit of time that the society is able to transmit. 
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APPENDIX 1. 
 
Variable Obs Mean Std. Dev. Min Max
Economic Stratification 175 2.451429 1.449013 1 5
Political Stratification 172 2.034884 1.112898 1 4
Division of Labor 175 3.097143 1.421001 1 5
Information Systems 175 2.36 1.466719 1 5
Transport 174 1.770115 1.160039 1 5
TCT 173 -.0025073 1.764571 -1.592768 4.569625
Population Size 174 3.45977 1.705514 1 8
Table 1. Descriptive Statistics
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
(1) (2) (3)   (4)   
Political 
Hierarchy
Political 
Hierarchy
Economic 
Stratification
Economic 
Stratification
Division of Labor 0.260*** 0.291*** 0.254*** 0.334***
(0.058) (0.058) (0.073)   (0.070)   
0.202*** -0.040 0.333*** -0.305   
(0.045) (0.136) (0.049)   (0.165)   
0.058 0.152***
(0.030) (0.036)   
Population Size 0.126** 0.118** 0.181*** 0.156***
(0.043) (0.042) (0.048)   (0.046)   
Intercept 0.809*** 0.666*** 1.039*** 0.667** 
(0.171) (0.197) (0.216)   (0.234)   
N 170 170 173   173   
R-sq 0.460 0.468 0.493   0.526   
F (3, 166)= 70.17*** (4, 165)= 53.82*** (3, 169)= 74.42*** (4, 168)= 53.82***
Note: p< .05; p< .01; p<.001
Table 2. Least Square Regression of Economic Stratification and Political Hierarchy on Division of Labor,TCT and 
Population Size, with and without the Interaction of Division of Labor and Information Systems/Transport
Division of Labor *
TCT
TCT
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(5)   (6)   (7) (8)
Political 
Hierarchy
Political 
Hierarchy
Economic 
Stratification
Economic 
Stratification
Division of Labor 0.699** 0.788** 0.678* 0.805**
(0.257) (0.260)   (0.265) (0.258)
0.405** -0.551   0.486*** -0.929
(0.142) (0.681)   (0.134) (0.616)
0.231   0.341*
(0.157)   (0.146)
Population Size 0.322* 0.303*  0.252 0.222
(0.144) (0.138)   (0.132) (0.134)
Intercept -4.508*** -4.925*** -4.487*** -5.083***
(0.883) (1.000)   (0.972) (0.976)
N 170 170   173 173
R-Square 0.348 0.358 0.367  0.387
Wald Chi-Square (3)= 48.03*** (4)= 44.89*** (3)= 44.42*** (4)= 40.77***
Note: p< .05; p< .01; p<.001
Table 3. Logistic Regression of Economic Stratification and Political Hierarchy on Division of Labor,TCT and Population 
Size, with and without the Interaction of Division of Labor and Information Systems/Transport
Division of Labor * 
TCT
TCT
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APPENDIX 2. 
 
Figure 1.  
Marginal Effects of Division of Labor on Economic Stratification across Observed 
Range of Information Systems and Transportation (Table 2 Model 2) 
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Figure 2.  
Marginal Effects of Division of Labor on Political Hierarchy across Observed Range of 
Information Systems and Transportation (Table 2 Model 4) 
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Figure 3.  
Marginal Effects of Division of Labor on Economic Stratification across Observed 
Range of Information Systems and Transportation (Table 3 Model 6) 
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Figure 4.  
Marginal Effects of Division of Labor on Political Hierarchy across Observed Range of 
Information Systems and Transportation (Table 3 Model 8) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
